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Abstract
Over the past decade or so, there has been widespread recognition that a large
and growing proportion of the global workforce is employed in informal sector
enterprises. To explain this, neo-liberals contend that enterprises operate in the
informal sector due to high taxes, public sector corruption and too much state
interference in the free market and that the remedy is therefore to reduce taxes,
public sector corruption and the regulatory burden via minimal state intervention.
To evaluate critically this neo-liberal policy approach, this paper explores whether
cross-national variations in the share of the workforce in informal sector enterprises are
associated with cross-national variations in the level of tax rates, corruption and
state interference. To do this, International Labour Organisation data on the share
of the workforce in informal sector enterprises in 43 developing and transition
economies is compared with cross-national variations in tax rates, corruption and
levels of state intervention using World Bank development indicators. The finding is
that there is little or no evidence to support the neo-liberal policy approach that
decreasing tax rates, public sector corruption and the regulatory burden via
minimal state intervention, reduces the share of the workforce in informal sector
enterprises. Instead, higher tax rates and levels of regulation and state intervention
are found to be associated with lower (not higher) levels of employment in informal
sector enterprise. The paper concludes by discussing the theoretical and policy
implications.
Keywords: Informal economy; Entrepreneurship; Public policy; Neo-liberalism;
Developing countries; Transition economies; Economic development
Background
Over the past decade or so, there has been growing recognition that enterprises
which operate in the informal sector are not some minor residue leftover from a
pre-modern mode of production existing in a few marginal enclaves of the global
economy (Geertz 1963; Lewis 1959) but are a pervasive and expanding feature of the
global economy employing some one-third of the global non-agricultural workforce
(Williams 2013). To explain this large and growing share of the workforce in infor-
mal sector enterprise, a neo-liberal school of thought has emerged which transcends
© 2014 Williams; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
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the traditional modernisation perspective depicting such enterprise as pre-modern
and a sign of under-development and backwardness and instead argued that enter-
prises operate in the informal sector due to high taxes, public sector corruption and
too much state interference in the free market and that reductions in taxation and
corruption along with de-regulation in order to minimise state interference in the
market are therefore required (Becker 2004; De Soto 1989, 2001; London and Hart
2004; Nwabuzor 2005). The aim of this paper is to evaluate critically the validity of
this neo-liberal perspective.
To achieve this, the first section briefly reviews the neo-liberal explanation for the
prevalence of informal sector enterprise and its consequent policy approach for tack-
ling enterprise in the informal sector, along with the other competing explanations.
Revealing that there have been no evaluations of the validity of this neo-liberal
approach in relation to developing and transition economies, the second section
then introduces the methodology here employed to do so. This investigates whether
there is a correlation between the cross-national variations in the share of the work-
force in informal sector enterprises and cross-national variations in tax rates,
corruption and state interference in the market. To do this, cross-nationally compar-
able International Labour Organisation data on employment in informal sector
enterprises in 43 developing and transition economies is compared with various
World Bank development indicators on tax rates, corruption and state intervention.
The third section then reports the results on the cross-national variations in the share of
the non-agricultural workforce in informal sector enterprises while the fourth section
conducts a preliminary analysis of the validity of various tenets of the neo-liberal
approach. The fifth and final section then draws conclusions regarding both the valid-
ity of the neo-liberal approach and tentatively calls for greater rather than less regula-
tion of the economy and state intervention to protect workers in order to reduce the
level of informality.
At the outset, however, what is meant by an informal sector enterprise needs to be
clarified. Here, the definition of informal sector enterprise is that adopted by the 15th
International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) in 1993 (Hussmanns 2005; ILO
2011, 2012). This defines enterprises in the informal sector as ‘private unincorporated
enterprises that are unregistered or small in terms of the number of employed persons’
(ILO 2012: 1). Informal sector enterprises are thus ‘unincorporated’ enterprises that are
also either ‘small’ or ‘unregistered’. By ‘unincorporated’ is meant that they are not con-
stituted as a separate legal entity independent of the individual (or group of individuals)
who owns it, and for which no complete set of accounts is kept. By ‘unregistered’,
meanwhile, is meant that they are not registered under specific forms of national legis-
lation (e.g., factories’ or commercial acts, tax or social security laws, professional
groups' regulatory acts). Holding a trade license or business permit under local regula-
tions does not qualify as registration. An enterprise is ‘small’, moreover, when its size in
terms of employment levels is below a specific threshold (e.g., five employees) deter-
mined according to national circumstances (Hussmanns 2005; ILO 2011, 2012).
Throughout this paper, therefore, informal sector enterprises are defined as private
enterprises that are unincorporated as separate legal entities and do not keep a
complete set of accounts for tax and social security purposes, and are also either
unregistered or small.
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During the twentieth century, the common belief was that the modern formal sector
was expanding and that the informal sector was a leftover from a pre-modern mode of
production and gradually disappearing (Boeke 1942; Geertz 1963; Lewis 1959). From
this modernisation perspective, the prevalence of informal sector enterprises in any
economy signals its ‘backwardness’ and ‘under-development’. As such, there is little rea-
son to pay much attention to the informal sector since such enterprises will naturally
and inevitably disappear with economic advancement and modernisation as the formal
sector becomes ever more totalising and hegemonic.
Over the past decade or so, however, this conventional modernisation perspective has
come under heavy criticism as it has been recognised that the informal sector is a per-
vasive and expanding sphere in many global regions (Buehn and Schneider 2012; Feld
and Schneider 2010; ILO 2011, 2012, 2013a; Jütting and Laiglesia 2009; OECD 2012;
Rodgers and Williams 2009; Schneider and Williams 2013; Williams 2014). Given this,
informal sector enterprises are no longer seen as some remnant, relic or residue from a
pre-modern period, resulting in the emergence of new explanations for its persistence,
prevalence and pervasiveness.
One explanation to have replaced the conventional modernisation perspective is a
political economy perspective which depicts enterprises operating in the informal sec-
tor not as prior to or discrete from, but as an integral aspect of, modern-day capitalism,
providing a channel for flexible production, profit and cost reduction. Informal sector
enterprises from this political economy perspective are therefore seen to be a core
component of the new sub-contracting and outsourcing arrangements emerging under
de-regulated global capitalism, as well as a means of livelihood for marginalised popula-
tions confronted by no alternative sources of support (Castells and Portes 1989; Davis
2006; Gallin 2001; Sassen 1996; Slavnic 2010; Taiwo 2013). Viewed through this lens,
employment in informal sector enterprises result from a lack of state intervention in
work and welfare to protect workers and such employed is seen as ‘sweatshop-like’
dependent employment and/or ‘false’ self-employment undertaken by workers out of
necessity (Ahmad 2008; Geetz and O’Grady 2002; Ghezzi 2010).
Over the past decade or so, however, this political economy perspective has been ques-
tioned, as it has been recognised that a large proportion of work in the informal sector is
conducted on a self-employed basis often as a matter of choice (Cross 2000; Cross and
Morales 2007; De Soto 1989, 2001; ILO 2002; Neuwirth 2011; OECD 2012; Small Business
Council 2004; Snyder 2004; Venkatesh 2006; Williams 2007 a,b, 2009 a,b; 2010; Williams
and Gurtoo 2011; Williams and Martinez-Perez 2014; Williams and Round 2007, 2009).
Based on this recognition, a neo-liberal explanation has come to the fore which views enter-
prise in the informal sector to be a direct result of over-regulation rather than under-
regulation (Becker 2004; De Soto 1989, 2001; London and Hart 2004; Nwabuzor 2005;
Small Business Council 2004). More specifically, the level of employment in informal sector
enterprises is viewed to result from high taxes, a corrupt state system and too much inter-
ference in the free market, which leads entrepreneurs and enterprises to make a rational
economic decision to exit the formal economy in order to avoid the time, costs and effort
of operating in the formal sector (e.g., Becker 2004; De Soto 1989, 2001; London and Hart
2004; Nwabuzor 2005; Sauvy 1984; Small Business Council 2004). From this neo-liberal
perspective, in consequence, operating in the informal sector is a rational economic deci-
sion taken by entrepreneurs stifled by high taxes, a corrupt public sector and state-
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imposed institutional constraints (de Soto 1989, 2001; Perry and Maloney 2007; Small
Business Council 2004). Informal workers voluntarily choose to operate in the informal
sector and are depicted as heroic figures throwing off the shackles of burdensome regula-
tions (e.g., Sauvy 1984; De Soto 1989). Such enterprise is thus seen as a form of popular
resistance to over-regulation and informal workers portrayed as a political movement that
can construct a rational competitive market economy (De Soto 1989).
Viewed through this neo-liberal lens, the level of employment in informal sector enter-
prises will be greater in countries with higher taxes, public sector corruption and greater
state intervention and the resultant remedy is for these countries to reduce tax rates, tackle
public sector corruption and pursue deregulation and minimal state intervention. As
Nwabuzor 2005 (26) asserts, ‘Informality is a response to burdensome controls, and an
attempt to circumvent them’, or as Becker 2004(10) puts it, ‘informal work arrangements are
a rational response by micro-entrepreneurs to over-regulation by government bureaucracies’.
Just because neo-liberals celebrate enterprises operating in the informal sector does
not mean that they advocate their promotion. Instead, they seek to eradicate informal
enterprises akin to political economists but for neo-liberal, this is to be achieved by
reducing taxes, corruption in the public sector and freeing up the state interference that
increases labour costs, prevents flexibility and acts as a disincentive to those wishing to
enter the formal sector. By decreasing the regulatory burden and state interference in
work and welfare arrangements, the goal is to erase the distinction between the formal
and informal sectors since such activity will be conducted in the manner now called
‘informal’, even if it will be ‘formal’ since it will not be breaking any rules.
Consequently, the neo-liberal approach is to reduce tax rates, tackle corruption, de-
regulate and give the market free reign by preventing state interference in economic af-
fairs and reducing state welfare provision. Akin to the political economists, neo-liberals
thus represent the welfare state and the economy as adversaries but the difference is
that while political economists are supportive of the welfare state and portray free
market capitalism as preventing social equality, neo-liberals support the free market
and oppose any intervention that constrains it. Whilst political economists depict state
intervention in the economy and social protection as necessary for efficiency and
growth, therefore, neo-liberals represent state interference in the economy and welfare
provision as interfering with the ability of the market to optimise the efficient allocation
of scarce resources. The neo-liberal approach is thus largely negative regarding the
benefits of social protection due to its negative effects on economic performance.
Instead, competitive self-regulatory markets are viewed as superior allocation mecha-
nisms (Lindbeck 1981; Okun 1975).
To evaluate critically the validity of this neo-liberal explanation, therefore, each of its
tenets can be tested by evaluating the following hypotheses:
 Tax rates hypothesis (H1): the share of the workforce in informal enterprises will be
greater in countries with higher tax rates;
 State corruption hypothesis (H2): the share of the workforce in informal enterprises
will be greater in countries with higher levels of public sector corruption; and
 State intervention hypothesis (H3): the share of the workforce in informal
enterprises will be greater in countries with higher levels of state interference in the
workings of the free market.
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Here, the intention is to evaluate critically these hypotheses in relation to 43 develop-
ing and transition economies in order to investigate the validity of this neo-liberal
school of thought.
Methods
To evaluate the neo-liberal perspective, firstly, the cross-national variations in the share
of the workforce in the informal sector is evaluated using an International Labour Or-
ganisation (ILO) dataset that uses the same common broad definition of informal sec-
tor enterprise across all 43 developing and transition economies covered and also the
same survey methodology. For each country, the Bureau of Statistics of the ILO sends a
common questionnaire to all statistical offices of each country requesting for the na-
tional offices to complete detailed tables on statistics regarding the level of employment
in the informal sector and informal employment. To provide this data, either an ILO
Department of Statistics questionnaire is used to undertake a survey or information
can be used from their national labour force or informal sector surveys already con-
ducted (for further details, see ILO 2012).
In each country, the same ILO definition of informal sector enterprise is used as discussed
above, although there are minor variations across countries due to the national variations in
what constitutes ‘small’ (e.g., employing less than five employees) and what constitutes an
unregistered enterprise due to the different national-level laws applying. Furthermore, in all
countries, persons with more than one job are classified by what they self-report as their
main employment and only non-agricultural employment is evaluated (i.e., agriculture,
hunting, forestry and fishing is excluded). As such, the data evaluated can be considered suf-
ficiently comparable between countries.
Meanwhile, the World Bank development indicators database is here used to identify
indicators of cross-national variations in tax rates, corruption and state interference.
For each indicator, data is reported for the same year in which the survey of the infor-
mal sector was conducted in each country (World Bank 2013). The only indicator from
a non-official source is on perceptions of public sector corruption, which is taken from
Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index (Transparency International
2013), again for the relevant year in each country.
To evaluate the neo-liberal tax rates hypothesis (H1), therefore, the following World
Bank (2013) country-level indicators are used:
 Taxes on goods and services as a percentage of revenue. This covers general sales
and turnover or value added taxes, selective excises on goods, selective taxes on
services, taxes on the use of goods or property, taxes on extraction and production
of minerals and profits of fiscal monopolies;
 Taxes on income, profits and capital gains as a percentage of revenue. This includes
taxes on the actual or presumptive net income of individuals, the profits of
corporations and enterprises, and capital gains on land, securities and other assets.
 Taxes on revenue (excluding grants) as a percentage of GDP. Revenue includes cash
receipts from taxes, social contributions and other revenues (e.g., fines, fees, rent
and income from property or sales).
 Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. Tax revenue covers compulsory transfers to
central government for public purposes. Compulsory transfers such as fines,
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penalties, and most social security contributions are excluded. Refunds and
corrections of erroneously collected tax revenue are treated as negative revenue.
 Total tax rate as percentage of commercial profits. This covers the taxes and
mandatory contributions payable by businesses after allowable deductions and
exemptions as a share of commercial profits. Taxes withheld (e.g., personal income
tax) or collected and remitted to tax authorities (e.g., value added taxes, sales taxes
or goods and service taxes) are excluded.
Meanwhile, the neo-liberal corruption hypothesis (H2) is evaluated using three measures:
 Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which is a
composite index of perceptions of public sector corruption from 14 expert opinion
surveys. It scores nations on a 0–10 scale, with zero indicating high levels and 10
low levels of perceived public sector corruption (Transparency International 2013).
 The percentage of firms making informal payments to public officials, and
 The percentage of firms expected to give gifts in meetings with tax officials.
Finally, the neo-liberal state interference hypothesis (H3) is evaluated using the
following measures:
 Time required (in days) to obtain an operating license;
 The cost of business start-up procedures, as a percentage of GNI per capita;
 The time required (in days) to start a business;
 Social contributions as a % of revenue. This includes social security contributions
by employees, employers and self-employed individuals, and other contributions
whose source cannot be determined, as well as actual or imputed contributions to
social insurance schemes operated by governments;
 State revenue as a % of GDP; and
 The expense of government, as a % of GDP.
To analyse this relationship between cross-national variations in the share of the
workforce in informal sector enterprises and the economic and social characteristics
each hypothesis asserts are associated, and given the small sample size of just 43 coun-
tries and lack of necessary controls to include in a multivariate regression analysis, only
bivariate regression analyses is here conducted. Given the non-parametric nature of the
data, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (rs) is employed to do this. Despite this
limitation of only using bivariate regression analysis, however, and as will now be seen, the
findings that result are meaningful regarding the validity of the different hypotheses.
Results and Discussion
In the 43 developing and transition economies for which ILO data is available on the
share of the workforce in informal sector enterprises, the finding is that the unweighted
average is that two in five (40.6 per cent) of the non-agricultural workforce have their
main job in informal sector enterprises. This, however, does not take into account the
variable size of the workforce across these economies. When this is done by taking the
weighted average, the finding is that just under one in three (31.5 per cent) of the non-
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agricultural workforce are employed in their main job in informal sector enterprises in
these developing and transition economies. This, therefore, refutes the modernisation
perspective by displaying that a large share of the workforce in developing and transi-
tion economies are employed in informal enterprises.
However, marked variations exist across global regions and also cross-nationally in
the share of the workforce in informal enterprises. Examining the variations across
global regions, the weighted proportion of the non-agricultural workforce in informal
sector enterprises ranges from 20.6 per cent in Europe and Central Asia, through 21.8
per cent in the Middle East and North Africa, 28.6 per cent in South Asia, 33.3 per
cent in Latin America and the Caribbean and 33.7 per cent in East Asia and the Pacific,
to 38.8 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, there are marked cross-national varia-
tions in the proportion of the non-agricultural workforce in informal sector enterprises,
ranging from 73.0 per cent in Pakistan to 3.5 per cent in Serbia (see Table 1).
To represent the relative importance of employment in informal sector enterprises in
these developing and transition economies, Figure 1 graphically does so by providing a
spectrum along which the countries can be located according to the share of the non-
agricultural workforce which has their main job in informal sector enterprises. As the
final column of Table 1 reveals, in no countries is the whole workforce either in formal
or informal enterprises, and there are no ‘nearly informal’ and ‘dominantly informal’
economies. However, 8 percent of countries are ‘largely informal’ economies, 9 percent
are ‘mostly informal’, 23 percent are ‘semi-informal’, 11 percent are ‘semi-formal’, 19
percent are ‘mostly formal’, 11 per cent are ‘largely formal’, 8 percent are ‘dominantly
formal’ and 11 percent are ‘nearly formal’ economies. Some 2 in 5 of the surveyed
countries, therefore, have over half of the workforce in informal sector enterprises.
Given these marked cross-national variations in the share of the non-agricultural
workforce in informal sector enterprises, attention now turns towards evaluating critic-
ally the tenets of the neo-liberal approach. To do this, an exploratory analysis of the
validity of each of the three neo-liberal hypotheses is here undertaken.
Evaluating the tax rates hypothesis (H1)
To evaluate the neo-liberal hypothesis that the share of the workforce in informal
enterprises is greater in countries with higher tax rates, the relationship between cross-
national variations in tax rates and cross-national variations in the share of the work-
force in informal enterprises is here analysed using five different measures of tax rates.
Starting with the association between the cross-national variations in the share of the
workforce in informal sector enterprises and the level of taxes on goods and services as
a percentage of revenue, and using Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient due to the
nonparametric nature of the data, no statistically significant relationship is identified
(rs = −.181). Neither is any significant association identified when comparing cross-
national variations in the share of the workforce in informal sector enterprise and
cross-national variations in the total tax rate (rs = .227).
However, examining the relationship between the share of the workforce in informal
sector enterprises and the level of taxes on income, profits and capital gains as a pro-
portion of revenue, a significant relationship is identified at the 0.05 level (rs = .414*).
As Figure 2a reveals, the direction of this relationship is that as tax rates rise, the share
of the workforce in informal sector enterprises increases, thus validating the neo-liberal
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Table 1 Share of non-agricultural workforce in informal enterprises
Country Global region (World
Bank classification)
Year % of workforce in
informal enterprises
Type of economy
Serbia Europe & Central Asia 2010 3.5 Nearly formal
Moldova Rep Europe & Central Asia 2009 7.3 Nearly formal
Macedonia Europe & Central Asia 2010 7.6 Nearly formal
Mauritius Sub-Saharan Africa 2009 9.3 Nearly formal
Ukraine Europe & Central Asia 2009 9.4 Nearly formal
Armenia Europe & Central Asia 2009 10.2 Dominantly formal
Russian Fed Europe & Central Asia 2010 12.1 Dominantly formal
South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 2010 17.8 Dominantly formal
China East Asia & Pacific 2010 21.9 Largely formal
West Bank & Gaza Middle East & North Africa 2010 23.2 Largely formal
Brazil Latin America & Caribbean 2009 24.3 Largely formal
Panama Latin America & Caribbean 2009 27.7 Largely formal
Dominican rep Latin America & Caribbean 2009 29.4 Largely formal
Argentina Latin America & Caribbean 2009 32.1 Mostly formal
Uruguay Latin America & Caribbean 2009 33.9 Mostly formal
Mexico Latin America & Caribbean 2009 34.1 Mostly formal
Venezuela Latin America & Caribbean 2009 36.3 Mostly formal
Costa Rica Latin America & Caribbean 2009 37.0 Mostly formal
Ecuador Latin America & Caribbean 2009 37.3 Mostly formal
Paraguay Latin America & Caribbean 2009 37.9 Mostly formal
Zimbabwe Sub-Saharan Africa 2004 39.6 Mostly formal
Ethiopia Sub-Saharan Africa 2004 41.4 Semi formal
Vietnam East Asia & Pacific 2009 43.5 Semi formal
Peru Latin America & Caribbean 2009 49.0 Semi formal
Lesotho Sub-Saharan Africa 2008 49.1 Semi formal
Liberia Sub-Saharan Africa 2010 49.5 Semi formal
Sri Lanka South Asia 2009 50.5 Semi informal
Tanzania Sub-Saharan Africa 2005/6 51.7 Semi informal
Madagascar Sub-Saharan Africa 2005 51.8 Semi informal
Bolivia Latin America & Caribbean 2006 52.1 Semi informal
Colombia Latin America & Caribbean 2010 52.2 Semi informal
El Salvador Latin America & Caribbean 2009 53.4 Semi informal
Nicaragua Latin America & Caribbean 2009 54.4 Semi informal
Honduras Latin America & Caribbean 2009 58.3 Semi informal
Uganda Sub-Saharan Africa 2010 59.8 Semi informal
Kyrgyzstan Europe & Central Asia 2009 59.2 Semi informal
Indonesia East Asia & Pacific 2009 60.2 Mostly informal
Zambia Sub-Saharan Africa 2008 64.6 Mostly informal
India South Asia 2009/10 67.5 Mostly informal
Cote d’Ivoire Sub-Saharan Africa 2008 69.7 Mostly informal
Mali Sub-Saharan Africa 2004 71.4 Largely informal
Philippines East Asia and Pacific 2008 72.5 Largely informal
Pakistan South Asia 2009/10 73.0 Largely informal
Source: derived from ILO (2012).
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hypothesis. When two further tax rate measures are analysed, however, this is not
the case. Examining the association between cross-national variations in the share
of the workforce in informal sector enterprise and cross-national variations in the
level of taxes on revenue and level of tax revenue as a share of GDP, significant
associations are identified at the 0.01 level (rs = −.604** and rs = −.585** respectively).
In both cases, as Figures 2b and c reveal, the direction of this relationship is that as
the level of taxes rises, the share of the workforce in informal sector enterprises
falls.
Of the five tax rate measures analysed, therefore, the neo-liberal hypothesis is only
confirmed in one of these measures and even then it is a relatively weak association.
In both cases where there is a strong statistically significant correlation between
cross-national variations in tax rates and the share of the workforce in informal
enterprises, the direction of the association is in the opposite direction to that
suggested in neo-liberal discourse. As tax rates rise, the share of the workforce whose
main job is in informal sector enterprises falls, displaying how countries with higher
social transfer levels have smaller shares of the workforce in informal sector enter-
prises, presumably because their populations are less dependent on the informal
economy as a survival tactic. This finding in developing and transition economies
reinforces recent studies in the advanced economies of Europe which identify little
or no support for the neo-liberal tax rates hypothesis and some support for the view
that higher tax rates, and thus presumably social transfers, reduce employment in
the informal sector (Vanderseypen et al. 2013; Williams 2013, 2014).
Evaluating the state corruption hypothesis (H2)
To evaluate this neo-liberal corruption hypothesis that the share of the workforce in in-
formal enterprises is greater in countries with higher levels of public sector corruption,
three different measures of corruption are analysed.
Starting with Transparency International’s perceptions of public sector corruption
index, a significant association at the 0.05 level is found between cross-national varia-
tions in the share of the workforce in informal sector enterprises and perceptions of
public sector corruption (rs = −.368*). As Figure 3 reveals, the direction of the relation-
ship is that higher shares of the workforce have their main job in informal sector enter-
prises in countries with greater perceived levels of public sector corruption, thus
intimating that enterprises exit the formal economy when they perceive high levels of
public sector corruption to exist. This, therefore, validates the neo-liberal public sector
corruption hypothesis. Nevertheless, this measure refers only to perceptions of corrup-
tion. It does not analyse whether they have actually had to deal with public sector
corruption.
When two measures of whether enterprises have actually dealt with instances of public
sector corruption are analysed, a different finding emerges. Comparing cross-national
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Figure 1 Classification of economies: by share of non-agricultural workforce in informal enterprises.
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variations in the proclivity of firms to report that they have made informal payments
to public officials with the cross-national variations in the share of the workforce in
informal sector enterprises, no significant association is found (rs = .185). Neither is
there any statistically significant association when cross-national variations in the
propensity of enterprises to state that they are expected to give gifts in meetings with
tax officials and cross-national variations in the proportion of the workforce
employed in informal enterprises (rs = .207). As such, even if one composite indicator
of perceptions of public sector corruption provides some weak evidence to support
R² = 0.2134
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Figure 2 Evaluation of the neo-liberal tax rates hypothesis. a. Relationship between share of workforce
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the neo-liberal public sector corruption hypothesis, measures of whether businesses
have actually suffered such corruption do not reveal any significant association.
Evaluating the state intervention hypothesis (H3)
To evaluate the neo-liberal state interference hypothesis which asserts that the share of
the workforce in informal enterprises is greater in countries with higher levels of state
interference in the workings of the free market, a variety of measures of different forms
of state intervention are here evaluated.
Starting with the impact of the regulatory burden on the propensity of employment
to be in the informal sector, cross-national variations in the time required in days to
start a business can be analysed. No significant association is identified (rs = .-.128).
Neither is a significant correlation found between cross-national variations in the share
of the workforce in informal sector enterprises and cross-national variations in the time
required to obtain an operating license (rs = .-.276). However, and as Figure 4a reveals,
there is a strong statistically significant association between cross-national variations in
the share of the workforce employed in informal enterprises and cross-national varia-
tions in the cost of business start-up procedures as a percentage of GNI per capita
(rs = .528**). The share of the workforce employed in informal sector enterprises is
higher in countries where the cost of business start-up procedures is relatively higher,
thus supporting the neo-liberal state intervention hypothesis.
However, it is important not to extrapolate from this one measure of the burdensome
regulatory environment for business start-ups and to conclude that all forms of state
intervention lead to greater levels of employment in informal sector enterprise. Take,
for example, the issue of whether state interference in welfare provision increases the
share of the workforce in informal sector enterprises as neo-liberals assert or reduces
the share as political economists argue. Analysing the association between cross-
national variations in the share of the workforce in informal sector enterprises and the
level of social contributions as a percentage of revenue, the finding is that there is a
significant association (rs = −.517*). As Figure 4b reveals, the direction of this relation-
ship is that the share of the workforce in informal sector enterprises is lower in coun-
tries which spend a larger share of revenue on social contributions. This refutes the
neo-liberal state intervention hypothesis and supports the political economy standpoint
that greater state intervention to protect citizens from poverty reduces the share of the
workforce in the informal economy.
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Indeed, this is further reinforced when the relationship between the cross-national
variations in the share of the workforce in informal sector enterprises and cross-
national variations in the proportion of the population living below the national poverty
line is examined. As Figure 4c displays, there is a strong statistically significant relation-
ship at the 0.01 level (rs = .429**). The greater is the share of the population living
below the national poverty line, the higher is the share of the workforce in informal
sector enterprises, thus supporting the political economy perspective that turning to
informal sector enterprise is more an activity of last resort undertaken by marginalised
populations in the absence of alternative sources of livelihood, rather than a voluntarily
chosen endeavour as asserted by the neo-liberal approach.
The neo-liberal thesis regarding state interference is further refuted, and the political
economy perspective further reinforced, when another proxy indicator of the degree to
which governments intervene in work and welfare arrangements is analysed. Examining
cross-national variations in the expense of government as a share of GDP and the share
of the workforce in informal sector enterprises, and as Figure 4d reveals, a strong
statistically significant association is identified at the 0.01 level (rs = .-548**). Countries
which spend a greater proportion of GDP on government have a smaller share of the
workforce in informal sector enterprises. This, therefore, again refutes the neo-liberal state
intervention hypothesis and provides support for the political economy explanation.
Indeed, there is evidence not only to support the political economy perspective but
also the modernisation perspective which argues that the share of the workforce in
informal sector enterprises is lower in developed modern economies, As Figure 5
displays, there is a strong statistically significant correlation at the 0.01 level between
cross-national variations in the share of the workforce in informal sector enterprises
and cross-national variations in GNP per capita (rs = −.584**). The direction of this
relationship is that the share of the non-agricultural workforce in informal sector
enterprises is greater in countries with lower levels of GNP per capita, thus supporting
modernisation theory.
Conclusions
Reporting ILO data on the share of the workforce in informal sector enterprises across
43 developing and transition economies, the finding is that just under one in three
(31.5%) have their main job in informal sector enterprises. The informal sector, there-
fore, employs a significant proportion of the workforce in developing and transition
economies. Nevertheless, marked cross-national variations exist in the share of the
workforce in informal sector enterprises and this paper has evaluated critically the neo-
liberal explanation that a higher share of the workforce is in informal enterprises in
countries with higher tax rates, greater public sector corruption and higher levels of
state intervention in work and welfare arrangements and therefore that tax reductions,
tackling corruption and pursuing minimal state intervention are the way forward.
(See figure on previous page.)
Figure 4 Evaluation of the neo-liberal state interference hypothesis. a. Relationship between share of
workflow in informal enterprises and cost of buseness start-up procedures b. Relationship between share of
workforce in informal enterprises and social contributions as % of revenue c. Relationship between share of
workforce in informal enterprises and % of population living below the national poverty line d. Relationship
between share of workforce in informal enterprises and expense of government.
Williams Journal of Global Entrepreneurship Research 2014, 2:9 Page 13 of 17
http://www.journal-jger.com/content/2/1/9
Evaluating the validity of this neo-liberal approach in relation to developing and tran-
sition economies, little evidence is found to support the neo-liberal tax rates hypothesis
(H1) that the share of the workforce in informal sector enterprises is higher in nations
with high tax rates. Only one of the five tax rate measures analysed supports this neo-
liberal tax rates hypothesis, and even this is a weak association at the 0.05 level. Three
of the four tax rate measures displaying a significant correlation with the share of the
workforce in informal enterprises, and both tax rate measures showing a strong significant
association at the 0.01 level, find the opposite to the neo-liberal tax rates hypothesis,
namely the share of the workforce in informal enterprises falls as tax rates increase. Simi-
larly, the neo-liberal state corruption hypothesis (H2) that the share of the workforce in
informal enterprises is greater in countries with higher public sector corruption levels, is
only confirmed when one composite measure of perceptions of public sector corruption is
analysed. Measures of state corruption which uncover whether enterprises have con-
fronted public sector corruption in practice find no significant correlation. Examining the
neo-liberal state intervention hypothesis (H3), meanwhile, although evidence is found that
the share of the workforce in informal enterprises is greater in countries where the cost of
starting a business is higher, this state interference hypothesis is not supported when one
extends analysis beyond the regulatory burden for business start-ups to broader measures
of state intervention in work and welfare arrangements. In sum, little or no evidence is
found to support the neo-liberal approach that the share of the workforce in informal sec-
tor enterprises is greater in countries with higher tax rates, corruption levels and greater
state interference, and that the solution is therefore to reduce tax rates, deal with state
corruption and pursue minimal state intervention.
However, support is found for the political economy approach which views the
share of the workforce in informal sector enterprises to be greater in countries with
lower levels of state intervention to protect workers from poverty. Not only are
cross-national variations in the share of the workforce in informal enterprises
strongly correlated with the level of poverty, but also higher tax rates, higher levels
of social protection and bigger government. This is doubtless because this diminishes
the need for marginalised populations to turn to employment in informal enterprises
as a survival practice of last resort in the absence of alternatives. Indeed, this study
of the cross-national variations in the share of the workforce in informal sector
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enterprises in developing and transition economies not only provides support for the
political economy approach but also the modernisation perspective since it reveals
that the share of the workforce in informal enterprises is lower in more developed
modern economies as measured by GNP per capita.
This preliminary analysis, therefore, has both theoretical and policy implications. Starting
with the theoretical implications, the validity of the neo-liberal approach is not supported
that higher proportions of the workforce are in informal enterprises due to higher tax rates,
corruption and state interference and thus that tax reductions, combating corruption and
decreasing the regulatory burden and state intervention is the way forward. Instead, tenta-
tive support is found for both the modernisation approach which views higher shares of the
workforce in informal enterprises to be associated with economic under-development and
the political economy approach which argues that higher levels of the workforce in informal
enterprises result from an under-regulation (not over-regulation) of economies and a lack
of state intervention to protect workers from poverty. Consequently, if cross-national varia-
tions in the share of the workforce in informal sector enterprises are to be explained, a syn-
thesis of the modernisation and political economy schools of thought is required which
explains lower levels of employment in informal sector enterprises to be associated with
economic development, higher tax rates and thus social transfers, smaller shares of the
population in poverty and greater levels of social protection. The validity of this new ‘neo-
modernisation’ explanation now needs to be evaluated using time-series data for individual
nations. It might also be useful to explore a wider range of economic and social conditions
associated with state intervention in, and regulation of, work and welfare provision (e.g., the
quality of state governance, labour market policy interventions to protect vulnerable groups,
the financial and managerial capabilities/level of education of enterprise owners) in order to
develop a more nuanced theoretical approach regarding what state interventions reduce the
share of the workforce in informal enterprises and which do not. Indeed, the influence of
the quality of governance in particular requires more detail investigation. In fragile environ-
ments for example, it may not be taxation itself but the level of corruption of state officials
and the perceived procedural and redistributive fairness of the state that is the burden. It
may also be that some environments with high quality governance may be entrepreneur-
ship-friendly and other environments entrepreneurship-unfriendly, and this will influence
the number pushed into informality. This needs to be investigated in future studies. Tax-
ation, moreover, also requires more detailed investigation. It may not be tax rates them-
selves but actual taxes collected that is important since high tax rates may be a direct
product of the ineffectiveness of tax collection and the low levels of collection of taxes owed.
These issues require further testing in future studies.
The above findings also have implications for policy. During the past few decades,
there has been a policy shift away from eradicating informal sector enterprises and
towards facilitating their formalisation as it has been recognised that the intention in
tackling such enterprise is to promote growth of the formal economy, decent work,
fuller employment and tax revenue to support wider societal objectives (Chen 2012;
ILO 2013b; Williams and Lansky 2013). Based on this desire to facilitate formalisation,
the policy debate has revolved around whether repressive measures and/or incentives
are the most effective means of achieving formalisation (Dibben and Williams 2012;
Eurofound 2013; Feld and Larsen 2012; ILO 2013b; OECD 2012; Williams and Nadin
2012). In this paper, however, and in stark contrast to the narrow conventional policy
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debate, the finding is that broader economic and social policy measures are also
important. The overarching modernisation of economies and reducing poverty through
higher taxes, and thus greater social transfers, and also higher levels of social pro-
tection, are all revealed to be close associated with the level of employment in informal
sector enterprises. Tackling the share of the workforce in informal enterprises, therefore,
appears to require not only a mix of targeted policy measures but also the introduction of
broader economic and social policies involving the greater provision of social transfers
and social protection. Whether this is confirmed when time-series data is examined for
individual countries, needs to be evaluated in future research.
In sum, this paper has evaluated for the first time in the context of developing and
transition economies the validity of the neo-liberal approach that advocates tax rate
reductions, tackling state corruption, de-regulation and minimal state intervention
when tackling employment in informal enterprises. It has found little evidence to sup-
port this neo-liberal policy approach. If this paper thus stimulates a wider questioning
of the validity of governments adopting this neo-liberal policy approach to tackle infor-
mal sector enterprise, then it will have fulfilled one of its goals. If it also encourages a
rethinking of whether greater state intervention to protect workers from poverty might
be the way forward in tackling the informal sector in developing and transition econ-
omies and beyond, then it will have fulfilled its broader intention.
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